Individual Health Insurance Mandates and Financial Distress: A Few Notes from the DebtorCreditor Research and Debates
Melissa B. Jacoby * Although I am a debtor-creditor researcher and not a health law expert, I could not resist the invitation of Dean Gail Agrawal and Professor Elizabeth Weeks to comment briefly on Massachusetts's recent ambitious efforts to secure universal health insurance coverage, 1 particularly because Massachusetts is not alone in experimenting with mandates to achieve higher rates of insurance.
2 My assessments at this time are necessarily tentative; not only am I a relative novice regarding * George R. Ward Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Thanks to Gail Agrawal and Elizabeth Weeks for inviting me to participate in the Symposium on the Massachusetts Plan and the Future of Universal Coverage, Nick Sexton and Michael Shumaker for helping me locate books and reports, and the University of North Carolina School of Law for financial support. Special thanks to Stephen Ware for his thoughtful written response. Although the editing process precluded meaningful reply here, I look forward to engaging with his ideas in future work. This writing is based on my oral remarks at the Symposium. The supporting research was conducted in fall 2006 and winter 2007 and reflects the state of events at that time.
1 2. Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger's plan similarly relies on a combination of individual mandates and employer mandates. Press Release, Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor of Cal., Gov. Schwarzenegger Tackles California's Broken Health Care System, Proposes Comprehensive Plan to Help All Californians (Jan. 8, 2007) , available at http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/press-release/5057/; see also Press Release, Edward G. Rendell, Governor of Penn., Governor Rendell's 'Prescription for Pennsylvania.' Will Ensure Access to Quality Health Care in a Variety of Settings (Jan. 18, 2007) , available at http://www.state.pa.us/papower/cwp/view.asp?A=11&Q=459427 (discussing health heart proposal). U.S. Senator Ron Wyden's plan uses individual mandates, albeit in a slightly different way, and also cuts the tie between place of employment and source of health insurance coverage. Healthy Americans Act, S. 334, 110th Cong. (2007) ; Press Release, Ron Wyden, U.S. Senator, Senator Wyden Leads Federal Debate on Health Care Reform (Jan. 16, 2007) , available at http://wyden.senate.gov/media/speeches/2007/01162007_Healthy_Americans.html. Prevailing presidential policy prefers tax incentives rather than penalties to encourage health insurance purchasing. George W. Bush, President of the United States, President's Radio Address (Jan. 20, 2007) The Commonwealth of Massachusetts could have framed the major policy issue it sought to tackle in terms of escalating medical costs. 5 Instead, it framed the issue in terms of insurance coverage. Lack of insurance is often used as a proxy for two problems: lack of regularized access to health care delivery systems, 6 and lack of protection from risk of major financial liabilities. 7 In other words, covering the uninsured is not so much an end as it is a means to achieve these objectives.
An individual mandate is one of several tools in the Massachusetts Plan to increase the number of citizens with health insurance, and thus presumably to address these underlying issues.
8 This also is a feature of other state and national health care reform proposals. 9 The individual mandate is a requirement to buy insurance or to pay a financial penalty to be enforced by the state department of revenue.
10 It is a "pay or play" provision of sorts, or, perhaps more accurately, "pay or pay."
11 The individual mandate cannot prevent Massachusetts's young and healthy residents from moving to New Hampshire or other nearby states to avoid its reach, but it is intended to force them into insurance pools to balance out risk.
12 The mandate also overrides subjective beliefs about the value of and need for health insurance, which is an issue I will return to at the end of my commentary. 13 An individual mandate can be somewhat harsh (or perhaps futile) on its own because, among other things, the price of insurance must affect the take-up rate to some extent.
14
Researchers from across the ideological spectrum likely agree that low-income people lack the financial means to buy many health insurance products regardless of their subjective assessments of its value. 15 The Massachusetts Plan seeks The fine will equal 50 percent of the least costly, available insurance premium that meets the standard for creditable coverage.").
11. See Mass. Plan, supra note 1, at CRS-4 (stating that "those who do not have insurance and are not exempt from the mandate will lose their state income tax personal exemption"). The Commonwealth Connector will be a clearinghouse for plans available for purchase by uninsured individuals. For an explanation of Commonwealth Choice, including plans for young adults, see Commonwealth Connector, Connector Programs, http://www.mass.gov (search for "Commonwealth Connector Programs"; then follow "Connector Programs" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 3, 2007) .
12. Cost-based refusal of insurance coverage by healthier young people is thought to contribute to adverse selection. See SWARTZ, supra note 7, at 129. This component of the Massachusetts Plan was made a priority, and, as of the time of this Symposium, enrollment was underway.
17 But beyond the lowest income residents, the enforceability of the individual mandate is conditioned on the availability of health plans that are "affordable," which is a term that the enabling legislation did not define.
18
Let us assume for now that the Massachusetts Plan will decrease the number of uninsured people in the Commonwealth and stabilize the coverage of some who previously cycled through periods of uninsurance.
19 Let us also assume that, in so doing, the Massachusetts Plan will hook previously uninsured people into health care delivery networks. This still leaves the question of whether the Massachusetts Plan makes progress toward the second underlying goal, which is to protect individuals against financial risk. I refer to this risk more generally as medical-related financial distress. By expending taxpayer resources and requiring greater out-of-pocket outlays from citizens through the individual mandate of the Massachusetts Plan, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts does not necessarily make its citizens more financially secure; it might just be shifting around the insecurity, which ultimately may undercut health care delivery goals. In theory, insurance coverage might reduce the need for bankruptcy, 20 lessen the reliance on high-priced credit products to smooth health care consumption, cut the demand for debt collectors specializing in self-pay medical receivables, produce declines in state debt collection lawsuits and resulting coercive collection, and reduce credit report notations for medical debt delinquency. Yet, empirical research suggests that being labeled as "insured"-the mere fact of insurance coverage-is not now synonymous with protection from financial risk arising from medical problems, and perhaps never will be.
21
Some of the most severe financial consequences of medical problems not covered by insurance are indirect, such as lost income and opportunity. 22 Regarding the direct costs of medical care, bankruptcy and health services research suggests that insurance coverage does not provide complete financial protection. 23 The first issue is the price of insurance itself. To the extent that rising medical costs send health insurance premiums to less affordable levels, requiring health insurance purchases could increase household financial difficulties rather than reduce them. 65 Years, 1996 to 2003 , 296 JAMA 2712 , 2715 tbl.1 (2006 . See also SWARTZ, supra note 7, at 4-6 (identifying rising costs of medical care as part of reason lack of insurance among middle class is rising); id. at 125 (discussing rising insurance premiums); David M. Cutler, Employee Costs and the Decline in Health Insurance KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 tackle health care costs, the Massachusetts Plan arguably puts its citizens in a bit of a bind. 25 As noted earlier, the legislature did not statutorily define "affordability," so it voted in favor of this plan without knowing which citizens would be absolved from the individual mandate on that basis.
26
As in many other means testing contexts, the details of the affordability determinations are likely to be controversial. 27 In any event, it remains possible that some households will be more financially stressed from health care costs with the individual mandate in place than without it. In addition, the penalty against an individual for failure to buy insurance is unlikely to be dischargeable if that individual files for bankruptcy. 28 This increases the significance of relying on individual mandates without also focusing on cost containment.
In addition to the financial impact of insurance premiums, there of course is the impact of out-of-pocket patient obligation (co-pays, deductibles, caps, exclusions). Insurance is so important in part because of the difficulty of predicting who will encounter catastrophic illness and when.
29 Yet, the medical expenses encountered by the vast majority of Federal Reserve researchers looking at a nationally representative sample of credit reports from the late 1990s found that 36.5% of the notations for medical bills were for $100 or less and that 70% were for $250 or less.
31
Only 4.2% of court judgments that could be identified as medical were for $5,000 or more. 32 Some insurance plans become "affordable" by shifting more financial responsibility for medical bills to patients, and thus an individual mandate coupled with an affordability threshold could increase medical debt delinquency.
Smaller unpaid bills may signify policy issues other than inadequately comprehensive health insurance. (stating that health insurance efficiency is principally intended to protect against the "risk of large and burdensome financial losses"). Some patients may prefer insurance offering comprehensive coverage even for small medical bills. See Glied, supra note 13, at 55 ("front-end coverage with a low-benefit maximum is likely to be perceived as more valuable than catastrophic coverage by lowincome uninsured people"). This preference matches to some extent with the prepaid group practice approach to health care finance and delivery. See, e.g., Alain C. Enthoven, Open the Markets and Level the Playing Field, in TOWARD A 21ST CENTURY HEALTH SYSTEM: THE CONTRIBUTIONS AND PROMISE OF PREPAID GROUP PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 237 (comparing comprehensive and low cost-sharing features of PGP as compared to consumer driven health plans); Raymond Fink & Merwyn R. Greenlick, Prepaid Group Practice and Health Care Research, in TOWARD A 21ST CENTURY HEALTH SYSTEM: THE CONTRIBUTIONS AND PROMISE OF PREPAID GROUP PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 158 (describing common features of PGPs).
34. For research using longitudinal data and finding large proportions of the population having been in poverty or using means tested welfare programs at some point in time, see Mark R. even small amounts of unexpected medical debt that arise at particular times. In addition, small medical debts may signify a lack of clarity or transparency over the scope of coverage rather than an under-insurance problem per se. Medical providers or their collectors may pursue informal or formal collection against patients who reasonably believe their insurance companies are paying a bigger proportion of bills than they actually do.
35
Delinquency on smaller medical debts also may be evidence of the absence of well-priced credit products that could smooth consumption for more routine medical liabilities. Households rely, at least to some extent, on credit rather than insurance for other significant and important expenses such as home ownership, cars, and education. These kinds of expenses are not so different from recurring costs of preventive and basic care, to which some of the standard economic explanations for health insurance apply with far less force.
36
Many of the medical-specific credit products I have seen so far anticipate unrealistically short payoffs or have steep interest rates.
37 But well-designed credit products issued by, say, community development credit unions, may be a useful supplement to insurance for some kinds of health care consumption-at least in the event that truly comprehensive prepaid group practices fail to take hold again. In any event, whether medical debt delinquency is due to under-insurance, lack of transparency, or the absence of appropriate 35. For myriad cases involving debt collection disputes regarding amounts uncovered by insurance, see, for example, Lockard v. Equifax, Inc., 163 F.3d 1259 , 1261 -62 (11th Cir. 1998 ) (involving plaintiff's allegation that his credit report contained medical debts that he did not owe); Spence v. TRW, Inc., 92 F.3d 380, 381 (6th Cir. 1996) (involving a credit report that referenced a debt for medical services that the plaintiff claimed was his insurer's responsibility); Kaplan v. Assetcare, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 1355 , 1358 (S.D. Fla. 2000 (upholding validity of plaintiff's claim against debt collector that allegedly attempted collection of a medical debt purportedly covered by plaintiff's insurance); Finnegan III v. University of Rochester Medical Center, 21 F. Supp. 2d 223, 228-29 (W.D.N.Y. 1998 ) (finding that plaintiff had a claim against debt collectors when plaintiff alleged that the collectors had pursued collection of a medical debt that plaintiff had repeatedly disputed) ; Blake v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc., 498 S.E.2d 41, 44-45 (W.Va. 1997) (concerning patient's fraud claim against hospital that won default judgment to collect the portion of patient's medical expenses that insurer did not pay) ; Victory Memorial Hospital v. Rice, 493 N.E.2d 117, 120 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986 ) (reversing a directed verdict for the patient in a hospital's suit to recover payment for medical services NATION 145, 172-73 (Henry J. Aaron et al. eds., 2003) (analogizing to the purchase of computers).
37. See, e.g., Jacoby & Warren, supra note 22, at 559-60 (listing various medical-specific credit products). credit products, it can impose significant emotional distress and adversely affect credit scores, which in turn may affect access to credit, rental housing, and employment.
38
My musings here suggest that an increased rate of insurance is not an automatic panacea for the underlying issues for which insurance coverage is often used as a proxy. Even assuming it does not itself impose financial pressure on a household, health insurance as it is now known protects against some but not nearly all of the financial risks associated with medical problems. A lack of financial protection can undercut the other underlying goal of covering the uninsured, namely health care delivery. Debtor-patients often report in surveys that medical debt and other financial problems deter them from seeking health care and adhering to prescription drug regimens.
39
I will end by commenting on another dimension of the discussion of individual mandates to buy health insurance. As noted earlier, the individual mandates are supposed to override subjective beliefs about the value of insurance and to incorporate younger and healthier residents into the risk pool. Some proponents of individual mandates believe they are necessary to combat free riding by those who "choose" more freely to be uninsured, consume health care without paying for it, and impose costs on others. 40 As in the parallel debates over the cost implications of a generous bankruptcy system, the scope of the free rider problem is not In any event, other kinds of laws from the debtorcreditor world could be enlisted to target the behavior thought to be undesirable.
For example, federal lawmakers could reduce the dischargeability of medical debts in bankruptcy for younger and more well-off filers.
42
Although medical debt collection already has significant consequences for individuals of modest means, 43 states could bolster medical providers' debt collection tools for higher income people. 44 In addition, consumer financial education-a tool mentioned frequently in debtor-creditor and consumer credit debates-should include insurance topics and not be limited to credit. 45 Whether independent of or in conjunction with a mandate, these kinds of steps could increase the extent to which citizens value health insurance and their willingness to pay into the health care system. UNINSURED (Aug. 25, 2006) at http://eriu.sph.umich.edu/pdf/conf2006_mortensen.pdf (finding that the combination of uninsured patients and low reimbursement rates from Medicaid beneficiaries are detrimental to a hospital's bottom line).
42. In theory, Congress has furthered this goal by implementing a detailed means test for chapter 7 filers with higher incomes. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2). In reality, however, the means test may not be well suited to achieving this goal. (forthcoming) ; SWARTZ, supra note 7, at 36 ("Interviews indicate that most view health insurance premiums as high relative to their expected medical expenses. It was striking that those under age forty spoke about health insurance as if it were prepaid medical care. They seemed to ignore the fact that insurance would enable them to shift the risk of high costs to insurers in exchange for a known monthly cost. Yet most knew that they did not have enough money to pay for serious medical care.").
